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We hypothesize that a computer user’s environment shapes the characteristics of his/her 
network traffic. In particular, we focus on whether a user’s role at the work place induces 
discriminating characteristics, due to the task requirements of assuming that role. If true, 
this shaping can enable development of useful indicators for detecting insider threat 
activities.  
 
We develop a methodology to evaluate this hypothesis, characterized by (i) new traffic 
similarity metrics for quantifying the variations of flow-level traffic activities between 
role-based user groups; (ii) use of exclusively Netflow data to build user/group 
discriminating features; and (iii) a rigorous process for attributing flows to users and 
mapping users to roles. 
 
We evaluate the role-based hypothesis using a four-week long dataset of Netflow records 
from a university building. We measure inter-system similarities using several flow based 
methodologies, and show significant levels of value overlap when computing inter and 
intra role-based group similarities. We did observe indications that similar roles lead to 
similar allocations of time for related tasks. We also found that most of the user traffic 
features under consideration persist over time, with a typical similarity value of above 0.8 
week to week. These findings lead us to believe that measuring role based group 
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I. I. INTRODUCTION  
Monitoring and profiling network traffic is an essential function of network management, 
used to protect systems from threats both external and internal. To accommodate diverse 
and ever-changing threats, anomaly-based approaches are frequently used to supplement 
misuse intrusion detection systems. Anomaly-based systems form a notion of “normal” 
traffic and alert on any deviations from this norm [1]. Unfortunately, determining what 
constitutes normal user, host, or application behavior can be difficult in practice.  
In this paper, we take inspiration from prior work in Role Based Access Control (RBAC) 
[2] and explore the impact of organizational roles on observable network traffic activity. 
Further, we examine the extent to which roles can be leveraged to better generalize per-
role legitimate traffic characteristics.  
 
In particular, we test the hypothesis that membership in role-related groups (e.g. clerical, 
engineering, students, etc.) bounds user network activity patterns, and that this bounding 
will be detectable in the distributions of features derived from Netflow records. 
Intuitively, one might expect a group of users with similar organizational roles to exhibit 
spatial and temporal locality, running the same set of applications, accessing similar 
network resources, etc. To better understand the impact of roles in shaping traffic, we 
measure several similarity metrics between users of the same role-based group, as well as 
between users of different roles.  
 
Complicating the validation of this hypothesis however are other non-human, non-group 
factors that shape observable network traffic feature distributions, or obscure their 
effects. For example, variations in system software, operating systems and systems 
hardware can contribute to traffic diversity over and above the variations caused by 
system users. While this may not be as big a problem among rigid IT deployments, many 
companies and educational institutions allow greater flexibility in system configurations. 
These variations may add noise to the problem. We explore the relationship between 
operating systems and a set of network traffic features used for our analysis, and compare 
this with the relationship between user roles and the features.  
 
We use live traffic from a campus building network to test our hypotheses. Importantly, 
we use external information (e.g. mapping between MAC and IP addresses) to attribute 
captured traffic flows to known users and determine each user’s organizational role (e.g. 
student, faculty, admin., etc.). The additional processing provides for a rich dataset where 
flows are labeled with ground-truth.  
 
In this work, we focus on behavior that may be inferred from NetFlow records. NetFlow 
is an attractive target due to its ubiquity. We categorize 35 known user systems into five 
role-based groups. Using 34 features derived from these users’ NetFlow records over the 
course of one month, we apply a variety of machine learning techniques to understand the 
impact of roles on traffic activity. Our primary contributions include:  
 
  The development of a methodology for examining the effect of organizational 
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roles in shaping network traffic activities. The methodology is characterized 
by three new traffic similarity metrics for quantifying the variations of flow-
level traffic activities between user groups, the use of exclusively Netflow 
data to build user/group discriminating features, and a rigorous process for 
attributing flows to users and mapping users to roles.  
   
  To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first in evaluating the role 
effect solely based on traffic features derived from Netflow data. The results 
reveal some evidence of clustering of traffic features around roles. In addition, 
the clustering appears to reflect similar allocations of time to related tasks. We 
also show that most of the user traffic characteristics considered in this paper 
seem to persist over time, with a typical similarity value of around 0.8 week to 
week.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of 
related work, followed by a detailed description of our methodology in Section 3. We 
present the evaluation results in Section 4, and discuss possible interpretations of the 
results as well as areas for future work in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.  
 
 3 
II. II. RELATED WORK  
Developing user profiles based on group behaviors is not a new concept. In Dorothy 
Denning’s landmark paper [1], she discussed the utility of profiling users or groups of 
users in order to detect deviations in behavior. Denning noted that “Aggregate individual 
activity reveals whether the behavior of a given user (or object) is consistent with that of 
other users (or objects).” Anderson et al. demonstrated this concept using IBM’s Identity 
Risk and Investigation Solution (IRIS) system [3]. Measuring features like the number of 
accesses to an application or login time of day they created a set of user profiles, and 
applied the concept of peer groups to develop expected norms of behavior. While this 
approach shows promise in leveraging group norms for monitoring behavior, the features 
used require access to application layer network data (or a monitoring application on each 
system), a much more intrusive level of monitoring than use of Netflow based features.  
 
Park and Giordano leveraged Role Based Access Control (RBAC) concepts [4] as a 
means of narrowing acceptable behavioral thresholds. Thresholds based on behavior 
related metrics were set by using the ranges observed among role-based groups. While 
the features used were not Netflow based, this paper did emphasize use of user roles (or 
groups) and historical behaviors as means for setting normal behavioral limits. Another 
study on the use of RBAC principles [5] used activity logs to compare behaviors, and 
found that the use of roles improved accuracy for detecting malicious insiders.  
 
Frias-Martinez [6] examined the use of system/user network behaviors as a means of 
applying Behavior-Based Network Access Control (BB NAC). Without employing 
external labels such as user roles, the BB NAC controller adds a new system to a network 
group based on similarities of behavioral profiles. These profiles are based on each 
system’s per-port network statistics, and similarities are computed by clustering these 
statistics to establish inter-system distances. Once in a group the new system’s network 
usage is monitored, and the group can “vote” on whether the system still fits in with the 
cluster norm. This approach is based on the assumptions/observations that computer 
usage statistics tend to be stable over time, and that usage behaviors tend to “cluster” in 
separable groups.  
 
The use of Netflow data is a common practice in traffic analysis and anomaly detection. 
Recent work showed that it is possible to mine Netflow data to detect worms and server-
like behaviors [7], and identify some applications [8] [9].  Karagiannis et al. used 
graphlets [10] based on Netflow level features to profile host applications usage. Nodes 
in a graphlet capture the kinds and number of connections created during some set period 
of time, embodied in links between protocol, destination IP, source port, destination port 
nodes. Profile graphlets are trimmed down to contain only “significant nodes”, which 
were defined as those with in-degree and out-degree counts greater than one. Using 
graphlets, it was possible to recognize usage of a number of applications by the user. 
Netflow level data has also been used to recognize changes in user behavior that were 
dependent on user working locations [11].  
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III. III. METHODOLOGY 
At a high level, our research methodology involves:  
Extracting features from one month’s worth of ingress and egress NetFlow traffic 
records from a university academic building.  
Leveraging external ground-truth to map IP sources to users, and users to 
organizational roles.  
Applying traffic similarity metrics and other analysis techniques to quantify how 
distinct the traffic features of users (or groups of users) are.  
 
This section details each of these steps, highlighting major challenges and approaches.  
 
A. DATASET  
We collected NetFlow records over a one-month period (July 18 to August 14, 2011) 
from a campus large academic building consisting of four academic departments, 
hundreds of people, as well as dozens of classrooms and computer labs. All non-lab end 
systems attached to the building’s wired infrastructure were under a single /21 subnet. A 
total of 892 unique IP addresses were present in the traffic trace.  
 
To get ground truth on a set of computer users on the network and their group affiliations, 
we solicited volunteers from each of the academic departments within the building in 
January, 2012. In that survey, we asked for information about roles, software (including 
the operating system) and computer IP and MAC address(es). We received 53 responses 
to the survey. System configurations varied: 41 were Windows 7 or XP, 22 were MacOS, 
and seven were Linux distributions. As this was an academic environment many users 
commonly made use of virtual machines, running other operating systems along with the 
host OS. These were not detailed in the survey results. For our analysis, operating system 
descriptions were not specified down to a specific Windows service pack level, MAC OS 
version or Linux distribution.  
 
Using the system MAC addresses, we isolated the packets passed to/from systems 
belonging to each volunteer from the data set prior to converting the packet data into 
Netflow records.  Extracting packets from capture files based on the MAC address 
enabled tracking user activities even IP addresses are reassigned by the DHCP server.  
 
Unfortunately, not all volunteer data was usable for analysis. Some volunteer hosts were 
either totally absent or sparsely active over the collection period. Some volunteers had 
changed systems between the collection period and the time of the survey. For these 
reasons, only 34 of the volunteer systems remained as viable study subjects.  
The roles we selected were somewhat broad in scope: PhD student, Administrative, 
Research Associate, Lecturer and Professor. While broad however, these categories 
represent sets of responsibilities and tasks with limited overlap, much like the ”multiple 
hat” roles found in most organizations. In addition, given a sampling set of 34 volunteers, 
creating more specific roles would have created much smaller groups.  
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B. IDENTIFYING OTHER USER FLOWS  
While we had isolated Netflow data for the systems used by our volunteers, we also felt it 
was necessary to identify a pool of non-attributed user systems as a reference on normal 
user traffic. This required scrubbing our collected data to eliminate any servers within the 
address space.  
To this end, we:  
• Dropped addresses providing services on SMTP, print server protocol, DNS, 
HTTP, POP3, NNTP, IMAP, SNMP, Service Locator Protocol, and HTTPS 
related ports.  
• Eliminated systems using fewer local ports than distant ports (typical of server 
behavior)  
• Cut systems with least twice the data going out as coming in during the test 
period  
• Dropped those systems with no apparent HTTP traffic, as use of the web has 
become such an essential human behavior.  
 
Role Group Size Flow Count 
Professor 15 5,435,523 
Lecturer 6 1,824,184 
Research Associate 5 1,280,757 
Admin 3 548,817 
PhD Student 5 1,807,773 
Other 399 103,630,469 
Table 1: User groups considered by this study  
 
We also dropped those IP addresses that had been active 10 days or less, in order to have 
enough data samples to compare in a meaningful manner. This address culling process 
reduced the remaining IP address pool to 399 distinct addresses, which we refer to 
collectively as the “Other” user group. While this culling process certainly removed a 
number of systems that were not servers, it did provide us with a pool of systems for 
which we had high confidence were not automated. This pool was our “control group,” in 
that we drew random groups of systems from the pool to test the null hypothesis, i.e. that 
belonging to a role based group does not impact the feature values we derived from 
Netflow. Table 1 summarizes the user groups extracted from the data set.  
 
C. EXTRACTING FEATURES 
To understand the influence of roles on network behavior, we focused on those flows 
generated during working hours, 0800–18:00 M-F (local time relative to collection). This 
was done to capture most common workday activities, as a means of investigating group 
network behaviors. As malicious users are known to not restrict their activities to 
business hours, we plan to expand this window at a later point to evaluate anomalous off 
hours activities.  
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The captured flows for each user were divided into sample sets of 15 minute intervals. 
Flows during each interval were analyzed, and features extracted based on the network 
activity observed. The interval of 15 minutes was chosen to provide enough flows to 
generate statistically meaningful features, and to capture user generated traffic 
representing from one to a small number of individual tasks. 
 
The maximum possible traffic from each user consisted of a total of 10 (hours per day) × 
4 (samples per hour) × 5 (days per week) × 4 (weeks) = 800 sample flow sets. Flows 
spanning more than one sample period were split accordingly, so that volumetric data 
(byte counts, etc.) would be represented during the correct period. 
 
1 port53Bytes	   Total	  bytes	  sent	  to	  port	  53	  (DNS)	  	  	  
2 port80Bytes	   Total	  bytes	  sent	  to	  port	  80	  (HTTP)	  	  	  
3 port443Bytes	   Total	  bytes	  sent	  to	  port	  443	  (HTTPS)	  	  	  
4 port993Bytes	   Total	  bytes	  sent	  to	  port	  993	  (IMAP)	  	  	  
5 numFlows	   Number	  of	  flows	  per	  interval	  	  	  	  	  
6 flagMetric	   Entropy	  measure	  of	  flag	  use	  among	  flows	  (SYN)	  	  
7 direction	   Fraction	  of	  flows	  that	  are	  outgoing	  	  	  	  
8 aveIntPktTime	   Standard	  deviation	  of	  average	  inter-­‐packet	  time	  	  	  	  
9 packets	   Total	  outgoing	  flow	  packets	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 bytes	   Total	  outgoing	  flow	  bytes	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 localPorts	   Total	  distinct	  local	  ports	  in	  flows	  	  	  	  
12 distPorts	   Total	  distinct	  distant	  ports	  in	  flows	  	  	  	  
13 interFlowTime	   Standard	  deviation	  of	  inter-­‐flow	  arrival	  times	  	  	  	  
14 duration	   Standard	  deviation	  of	  flow	  duration	  times	  	  	  	  
15 numDist	   Number	  of	  distant	  IP	  addresses	  per	  interval	  	  	  
16 protocol	   Fraction	  of	  flows	  using	  a	  given	  protocol	  (TCP)	  	  
17 bytesPerPacket	   Average	  of	  flow	  bytes	  per	  packet	  	  	  	  
18 emptyTCP	   Entropy	  of	  TCP	  flow	  counts	  with	  no	  payload	  data	  
19 serviceNets	   Entropy	  of	  distant	  IP	  address/ports	  	  	  	  	  
20 ipDistance	   Std	  deviation	  of	  IP	  distances	  of	  all	  flows	  	  
21 portsPerFlow	   Average	  number	  of	  distinct	  distant	  ports	  	  	  	  
22 addrPerFlow	   Average	  number	  of	  distinct	  distant	  IP	  addresses	  	  	  
23 addrDist	   Std	  deviation	  of	  IP	  distances	  of	  all	  flows	  	  
24 portDist	   Std	  deviation	  of	  local/distant	  port	  numbers	  of	  all	  flows	  
25 notTCPUDP	   Graphlet:	  #	  out-­‐degree	  links	  from	  other	  proto.	  nodes	  	  
26 TCP	   Graphlet:	  #	  out-­‐degree	  links	  from	  TCP	  nodes	  	  	  
27 UDP	   Graphlet:	  #	  out-­‐degree	  links	  from	  UDP	  nodes	  	  	  
28 maxDistIP	   Graphlet:	  max	  out-­‐degree	  count	  for	  distant	  IP	  node	  	  
29 maxLocPort	   Graphlet:	  max	  out-­‐degree	  for	  a	  local	  port	  node	  	  
30 maxLocPortIn	   Graphlet:	  max	  in-­‐degree	  for	  a	  local	  port	  node	  	  
31 maxDistPort	   Graphlet:	  max	  out-­‐degree	  for	  a	  distant	  port	  node	  	  
32 maxDistPortIn	   Graphlet:	  max	  in-­‐degree	  for	  a	  distant	  port	  node	  	  
33 maxDistAddrIn	   Graphlet:	  max	  in-­‐degree	  for	  a	  distant	  IP	  addr	  node	  
34 serverRatio	   Graphlet:	  ratio	  of	  maxLocPort	  to	  maxDistPort	  	  	  	  
Table 2: Features evaluated 
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We extracted 34 features from each flow set, as described in Table 2. Some features were 
intuitive choices, e.g., the amount of traffic to/from well-known server ports or the 
standard deviation of inter-flow arrival times. For such features, we built in the capability 
of filtering the flows based on flow direction, local or distant port numbers, or the 
protocol used. Flow derived numerical values could be summed, or have the mean or 
standard deviation computed. For categorical features (flags, ports, protocols or IP 
addresses), the flow derived values can be counted (e.g. total number different ports) or 
the normalized entropy computed. Thus even a limited set of basic features could be used 
to produce a diverse set of values describing an interval’s flows. Other features were 
inspired from the literature, e.g., the count of flows with empty or non-empty payload [8] 
for a given protocol, computing a distance between local and distant ports and addresses 
[12], and the graphlet concept developed in the BLINC work [10]. 
 
The graphlet features were the most complex to define and extract.  A graphlet is a 
directed graph with each path, from a common starting node, encoding a unique five 
tuple <source IP, protocol, distant IP, source port, distant port> found in a set of flows. A 
graphlet can succinctly represent the level and types of diversity found in the flow data.  
 
To try and capture some of the information embedded in the structure of a graphlet, we 
created features based on the number of in-degree and out-degree connections of the 
nodes. For each interval, the maximum in-degree and out-degree connection counts for 
the local port, distant port, and distant IP address nodes were captured. We also extracted 
the number of out- degree connections for the TCP and UDP protocol nodes, and from a 
catch-all (notTCPUDP) protocol node. As servers tend to have flows using a few local 
service ports and many distant ports, another feature based on the ratio of the 
maxLocalPort to maxDistPort was created. While these values fail to capture all the 
semantic meaning within a graphlet structure, they do provide some insight. 
 
Two of the features we tested, serviceNets and ipDistance, were created for these 
experiments. The former measures the entropy of the distant addresses and ports visited, 
as a measure of the variability of sites/services visited by the user. The entropy was 
computed by merging the distant IP address and port values into a single pattern (e.g. 
157.166.226.25 port 80 becomes 157.166.226:80). Commonly, multiple server hosts in 
one /24 subnet can provide the same service (e.g., CNN); this merging of address and 
port information helps consolidate sites providing a common service. 
 
A simple IP distance metric was used to represent the difference between a flow’s source 
and destination IP addresses, formally ipDistance = log(|srcIP − destIP |), where srcIP and 
destIP are interpreted as 32-bit integers. ipDistance is usually captured as the standard 
deviation of the local/distant IP address distances for all flows in the interval, providing a 
slightly different view on destination address diversity.  Other IP address distance metrics 
exist.  A more realistic IP address measure (addrDist) was derived from Coull et al. [12], 
in which IP addresses are compared based on category (Unicast: public, private; Other: 
multicast, broadcast, link local, default network). This alternate IP distance metric was 




Comparisons for this analysis were based on feature vectors, using the 34 features 
described above.  Each feature vector consisted of 34 feature values, representing the 
network activity of a system between times t and Δt (Δt = 15 minutes).  Each system was 
associated with one user (who may operate one or more systems), and each user was 
associated with one role.  These relationships were in part an effect of the user/system 
selection process applied for these tests; in many networks systems may be used by more 
than one user and a user may have more than one defined role.   
 
Thus for users ! = !!,!!,… ,!! , systems ! = !!, !!,… , !!  and roles ! = !!, !!,… , !! , we can represent a feature vector A  tied to user i associated with role j  
using system k at time t as ! = ! ! ! ! ! .   
 
For equations in which specific elements within a vector are referenced, say the ith 
component in vector A, the value is denoted as !!. 
 
 
E. FEATURE CORRELATIONS WITH ROLES/OS 
We correlated user membership in a specific role (indicated with a binary vector) with the 
features in each feature vector, using Pearson’s algorithm. Each feature vector ! ! ! ! !  was prepended by a p length binary vector (for the p roles, membership/ 
non-membership denoted by 1/0), creating a new vector !! ! ! ! !  . For 34 features 
plus 5 roles, this created a 39 x 39 correlation matrix. 
 
For comparison purposes we also correlated each feature vector to each type of OS found 
in the dataset, where !"   ∈ {!"#$%,!"#,!"#$%&'  !",!"#$%&'  7}, using the same 
approach as used for role correlation. 
 
F. SIMILARITY MEASURES 
Ideally, our features should enable some measure of how similar (or dissimilar) different 
computer users or groups are in terms of computer usage. One potential approach to 
similarity measurement would be to compare the distributions of feature values between 
users and/or groups. If usage behavior is consistent relative to a given feature, this should 
be reflected in recurring value distributions within groups.    
 
1. Feature Distributions:  
To compare systems based on feature distributions, we expressed the distributions as 
histograms (i.e. Probability Mass Function – PMF).  Each histogram bin covers a subset 
of the total feature value range. Bin value ranges could be linearly spaced, but for 
features with large values (such as total byte counts) the bin ranges were spaced non-
linearly (exponential growth). Using non-linear spacing can address the “mice and 
elephants” nature of network traffic by spreading out smaller value ranges and 
compressing larger ones. Additionally, as we denoted periods of no traffic using zero 
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values for each feature, we found that creating a special “zero bin” was useful to 
represent periods of inactivity. 
 
Our initial attempt at evaluating the similarities of feature distribution vectors was to 
apply a simple cosine similarity computation: 
 !!"#$%& = !!!!!!!!(!!)!  !!!!    (!!)!!!!!  
 
While algorithmically simple, this approach turned out to be the least useful. The 
resulting similarity values obtained when comparing two groups varied widely, to the 
extent that group to group similarity plots (such as in Figures 2-4) showed the 95% 
confidence intervals occupying much of the [0,1] range for most features. 
 
As a means of exploring this approach to comparing users and groups, we evaluated two 
other methods for comparing feature value distributions as a measure of similarity. These 
were termed the Bin Ratio measure and the Kolmogorov–Smirnov (KS) based measure. 
This last measure was derived from the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test for Empirical 
Distribution Function (EDF) equivalence. Each measure returned values between [0,1]. 
 
a. Bin Ratio Measure:  
To focus on the proportionality of distribution values on a bin by bin basis, we created 
the bin ratio measure.  This measure is determined by computing the value ratio for each 
corresponding pair of PMF distribution bins, and using the average ratio value across the 
distribution as the similarity measure. Formally: !!"#$% = 1! min !!!, !!! /max  (!!!, !!!)  !!!!  
 
where !  ! and !  ! are PMF distributions of feature  f  from systems A and B. 
 
b. Kolmogorov–Smirnov (KS) Based Measure:  
The Kolmogorov–Smirnov test for two distributions essentially involves overlaying the 
EDFs of the two distributions and computing the maximum vertical distance between the 
two curves. 
 
For our variation of the KS test as a measure of similarity, we convert the PMFs of a 
given feature for two systems into EDFs.  From these we compute the ratio between the 
“difference area” (Figure 1) and the total area under the two EDF curves. We subtract this 
ratio from one; if the EDFs are identical there is no area between the curves and the KS 
similarity measure is 1.0. 
 
Formally, the KS similarity metric is defined: 
 
 10 
!!" = 1! min !!!,!!! /max  (!!!,!!!)  !!!!  
 
 
where !  ! and !  ! are feature EDF distributions from systems A and B. 
 
Figure 1: Kolmogorov-Smirnov Based Measure 
 
 
G. MACHINE LEARNING 
For testing the separability of the groups based on the feature vectors, we applied 
machine learning tools (a J48 decision tree from Weka [14], the Relief algorithm from 
Orange [15], and a k-means clustering program). The ML techniques were applied in 
different ways, each providing a different view of the data. 
 
The first application of machine learning was to rank our 34 features using the Relief 
algorithm, which scores features based on their ability to correctly classify data points to 
their assigned classes. Each feature vector in the data set was labeled first (assigned a 
class) using the user role label associated with the system that produced the data.  The 
features in the labeled vectors were then ranked.  This process was repeated using the 
operating system type of the source system as the assigned class. 
 
The second machine learning application was to test how well a J48 decision tree could 
discriminate between the different users or groups, based on a subset of the features. This 
test was one of our earlier investigations into group network features.  As such, it was 
based on a subset of the features in Table 2 (items 1-3, 7, 9-11, 13, 18-20, 25-27, 29- 31, 
33, 34). Another key difference was that the feature interval for these tests was an hour, 
rather than 15 minutes. As other tests performed on both the hour long intervals and 15 
minute intervals (Bin ratio and Kolmogorov-Smirnov similarity measures, k-means 
clustering) yielded highly similar results, the results of this test is included in this report. 
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The classifier was applied in three ways. First, each feature vector was labeled using the 
hardware address of the user system that produced the data, and the labeled vectors were 
used to train/test the classifier using 10-fold cross validation. We next tested the data 
samples using group name labels, again using 10-fold cross validation. As an added 
check, we tested against sets of pseudo-groups, similarly sized groups of users drawn 
randomly from the unlabeled (”Others”) data set. This was repeated five times with 
different random groups, and the mean false positive rates, false negative rates and F-
scores reported. 
 
The third machine learning approach tested was to apply k-means clustering to the data. 
Clustering multi-dimensional data is a well understood method of determining whether 
data sets exhibit well defined groupings of values. To see if the data samples from the 
same group would cluster in similar patterns (and differently from other groups), we 




IV. IV. RESULTS  
H. CORRELATION  
One view of how features might relate to a user’s role or the operating system of the 
computer used can be obtained by correlating feature values with the categories of 
interest. We labeled each system features vector with additional fields (0 or 1) 
representing membership in one of the role based groups. The correlation values for each 
feature against the user’s role were ordered in terms of absolute value, and are presented 
in Table 3.  
 
 
Role Correlation Feature 


























Table 3: Top Correlated Features for Roles 
 
 
The top correlated features for the primary operating systems observed on the network 




OS Correlation Feature 





















Table 4: Top Correlated Features for Operating Systems 
 
As can be seen from these tables, the largest correlation value for role based groups is 
approximately 0.30 (Admin group, bytes per packet feature), while there are two 
correlation absolute values for operating systems larger than 0.4 in absolute value. These 
are (XP,  notTcpUdp) at approximately 0.48 and (Linux, addrDist) at approximately 0.43.  
 
I. SIMILARITY MEASUREMENT  
The ranges in similarity measures for comparing the PhD students to the Professors group 
are shown in Figures 2-4 for each of the similarity measures. In these graphs, a similarity 
measure of 1.0 would mean that the distributions were identical, whereas values closer to 
zero would show no commonality in the distributions. The Feature Index along the X axis 
refers to the features listed in Table 2.  
 
For the plots in these figures, groups are compared by measuring the similarity values 
between each member of one group with each member of the other group. If the groups 
are the same, systems are not compared with themselves.  In the charts, PhD Student to 
PhD student group similarity measures are shown in blue, while the PhD student vs. 
Professor Group distributions are shown in green.  
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As can be seen in the graphs the similarity measure ranges for all features overlapped 
significantly. This pattern was observed for all group vs. group comparisons; i.e. it 
appeared that for any feature chosen, the ranges of the intragroup similarity measures was 
consistently on a par with intergroup similarity measure ranges.  
 
Figure 2: Bin Ratio Measure 
 
Figure 3: Kolmogorov-Smirnov Measure 
 
Figure 4: DTW Measure 
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J. MACHINE LEARNING  
1) Relief Algorithm: To evaluate the suitability of our 34 features, we applied the Relief 
algorithm to rank them using group labels as target classes. The Relief algorithm is 
instance based (like our data), and provides a relevance weight to each feature based on 
its ability to predict the given class. The top five ranking features for classifying user 
roles were addrDist, duration, portDist, protocol, and ipDist, based on Relief ranking. The 
top five ranking features for operating systems were portDist, addrDist, protocol, ipDist 
and flagMetric. The Relief scores for the operating system labels were higher, with a 
range of 0.044-0.098 for the top five versus 0.039-0.052 for the role based group labels. 
For comparison, the Relief scores for the classic Fisher’s iris plant petal dataset [16] 
(used for data mining training) range from 0.13-0.372. 
 
2) Decision Tree: The results of the J48 decision tree testing are shown in Table 5. This 
test was run to determine whether the use of groups as a category provides any 
improvement in the ability of a classifier to identify feature sets derived from each group. 
In other words, does traffic from a set group have common characteristics that make the 
data more amenable to classification?  
 
In addition to the role-based and random groups, we also tested the classifier on data 
labeled by the machine address of the source system. The table reports the average 
statistics for each group type. Weighted averages are computed for the role-based groups 
to account for their different sizes.  
 
We note that although the decision tree was able to classify both individual user and 
groups fairly well using our features subset, the classifier performed only slightly worse 
(F-scores of 0.69 vs. 0.75 and false positive (FP) rates of 29.2% vs. 24.4%) at classifying 
the randomly selected groups of users.  
 
Group Type FP Rate FN Rate F-Score Rule Count 
Role-based 24.40% 24.60% 0.751 675 
Random 29.20% 29.90% 0.692 769 
Individual 26.40% 29.50% 0.716 891 
Table 5: Classification Accuracies Using Decision Tree 
 
This result implies that, at least for the features tested, the role based groups did not 
exhibit strong common characteristics to make them more separable as a group. This is 
also reflected in the large number of rules required for the classification (approximately 
1/8th the number of samples), reflecting fairly low level classifications. Still, the 
classifier performed better with the role labeled data set and required fewer rules as 
compared to the system level or pseudo group data sets. While statistically not strong 
evidence, this implies some level of feature commonality may have enabled greater 
generalization by the classifier.  
 
These results must be caveated by the fact that the dataset used was based on hour long 
intervals rather than 15 minute intervals.  Based on the close similarity of results of other 
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tests using both interval periods, we expect that later tests using the full feature set and 15 
minute interval based features would result in the same findings. 
 
3) Clustering: After the data samples from the different users were clustered using k-
means, we tabulated the percentage of samples assigned to each of the five clusters 
(Table 6) for each system. Unsurprisingly, we did not find an Administrative cluster, a 
PhD student cluster and so on. Instead, the data samples from the different systems were 
allocated in varying proportions across the five clusters. One possible interpretation of 
this would be that the cluster centers corresponded to common sets of user activities, and 
the allocations reflected the percent of time spent in these activities.   
 
Group A B C D E 
Lecturer 79.05 0.48 0.16 4.13 16.19 
73.22 0.50 0.00 0.38 25.91 
58.87 0.39 7.84 1.93 30.98 
2.83 0.17 1.67 8.67 86.67 
8.97 0.85 5.98 23.08 61.11 
21.41 0.32 7.99 2.24 68.05 
Admin 31.87 0.29 2.92 2.34 62.57 
3.88 0.38 92.49 0.00 3.25 
41.98 0.65 1.30 8.75 47.33 
25.41 0.50 2.13 1.63 70.34 
PhD_student 11.57 0.15 3.24 34.41 50.62 
42.99 0.31 0.62 1.25 54.83 
13.51 0.00 30.81 14.05 41.62 
4.96 0.00 44.33 5.67 45.04 
18.65 0.00 23.78 6.38 51.19 
19.50 0.00 4.15 5.39 70.95 
Research_Assoc 94.12 0.00 0.00 0.75 5.13 
9.38 0.52 1.30 10.94 77.86 
66.83 0.00 4.88 0.25 28.04 
2.71 0.29 69.71 5.00 22.29 
Professor 62.95 0.38 0.00 6.63 30.04 
21.23 0.00 3.73 1.94 73.10 
57.07 0.38 0.38 2.88 39.30 
28.98 0.38 4.61 12.86 53.17 
14.14 0.50 0.88 0.00 84.48 
61.80 0.00 1.12 0.00 37.08 
66.33 0.50 0.50 13.39 19.27 
6.49 0.70 0.88 22.11 69.82 
80.35 0.50 5.76 0.25 13.14 
7.51 0.00 4.38 1.75 86.36 
19.92 0.57 51.04 0.57 27.89 
0.50 0.00 0.00 8.64 90.86 
9.89 0.00 0.63 6.51 82.98 
54.08 0.47 0.63 4.39 40.44 
92.99 0.38 0.13 0.88 5.63 
Table 6: K-means Feature Vector Clusters 
 
Reviewing the tabulated data, it did not immediately appear that these splits of sample 
data were consistent within the different groups. To reduce the five dimensional vectors 
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(one per cluster) down to three dimensions, we performed a Principal Components 
analysis of the tabulated results. Figure 8 shows a scatter plot based on three of the 
Principal Component axes.  
 
Figure 5: Principal Components View of Clustering Data 
While not showing a definitive separation of the five groups, Figure 5 does seem to show 
some natural clustering for subsets of the groups. If our interpretation of clusters 
corresponding to common tasks is valid, then this apparent grouping would reflect 
patterns in the way user groups allocate their time.  
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V. V. DISCUSSION  
The results of our investigations provided a qualified validation of our original 
hypothesis, i.e. that user roles have an effect on the network behaviors observed.  
 
Correlation: While correlating the feature values with binary indicators of group 
membership is a fairly simple test, it was informative. None of the features displayed a 
correlation to any of the role based groups with a value greater than about 0.3. 
Correlation of the features with the operating system of the user’s computer displayed 
significantly higher values (0.4783 for notTcpUdp to XP, 0.3884 for portDist to 
Windows 7). Many campus users employ virtual machines on their computers (running 
different operating systems), which could ”muddy the waters” relating to mapping 
operating systems to network features. Even with this, the relationship between the 
features studied and host operating systems was notably stronger than that between the 
features and user roles.  
 
Similarity Measures: The three system similarity measures provide methodologies for 
comparing systems based on a selected set of network features. The Bin Ratio and 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov based methods provide new approaches for comparing features 
based on differences in feature distributions. The Dynamic Time Warping, or feature 
sequence analysis approach provides a means of evaluating sequences of network 
features for establishing system similarities. While the system similarity measures 
investigated showed significant range overlap between intra-group and inter-group 
settings, this was of course dependent on the group labels used. The labels were an 
external construct; further investigations into how these features and similarity measures 
form natural groupings should provide insight into other useful applications.  
 
Machine Learning: The classification tests using machine learning techniques did provide 
insight into the level of association between the Netflow based features and user role 
groups. Features scored higher when tested using the Relief algorithm against operating 
system labels than against user group labels, indicating system configurations have a 
stronger impact on network traffic.  The use of fewer rules by the decision tree and the 
(slightly) higher F-scores for the group labeled data appeared to indicate the existence of 
group commonalities, but with only a weak effect on system classification. K-means 
clustering of the data with the number of clusters equal to the number of roles did not 
initially show a correlation between cluster centers and the selected groups. This is not in 
itself surprising, as there are any number of different reasons some users and systems 
may appear more similar (common operating systems, software loads, working schedule, 
interests, etc.). That said, the scatter plot in Figure 5  indicates to us that the group 
commonalities lay in the manner of how group members split their time at tasks.  
 
Because users are individuals and we rarely see rigidly defined roles in organizations, 
identifying the impact of user roles on network traffic is inherently difficult.  Having 
ground truth about both users and their computer systems was an essential aspect of 
enabling our methodology for analyzing network traffic. With it, we not only could 
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identify, extract and label network traffic passing to/from those systems, but also identify 
a set of non-volunteer systems to use as a control group. For investigating the null 
hypothesis, i.e. that Netflow based statistical features are not shaped by the role of the 
user generating them.  Having a control group enables a differential analysis between 
labeled and unlabeled data sets.  
 
Applying a diverse set of features, covering a range of different network traffic 
characteristics, was also an enabler for our investigation. It allowed some measure of 
generalization about how interval based statistical features may (or may not) be 
applicable in characterizing a specified set of groups. If all of the features perform poorly 
in establishing normal behavioral ranges for individual groups, it can be taken as an 
indicator that this class of feature types will not do well for this purpose. 
 
The general consistency of range overlaps when comparing groups, regardless of which 
of our features were examined, indicates to us that context free Netflow based statistical 
features provide an incomplete view in defining group behavior. In a diverse network 
environment such as found on a typical campus, what signal might be there relating 
features to groups may be obscured by the variations in features provided by different 
system configurations.  
 
So how to follow up on these results? The feature set examined for this analysis was far 
from complete [17], so more exploration of potential features is needed. The features 
tried to date contained no contextual information, i.e. no semantic meaning was attached 
to specific ports or distant IP addresses.  
 
Temporal context was present and used to compute similarity using Dynamic Time 
Warping, but there are many more ways temporal patterns can be scrutinized. 
Investigating temporal aspects such as using frequency based analyses, identifying flow 
sequences with tools such as Hidden Markov Models, classifying system based on n-
gram sequences of distant IP addresses, and many other approaches could bear fruit in 
this area. Varying the interval time might lead to different results, although prior 
experiments using hour long intervals yielded very similar outcomes. Finally, playing 
with the Netflow generation parameters to keep flows short for greater temporal 
resolution may enable more definitive results.  
 
Semantic context can be added by assigning meanings to sets of distant IP addresses and 
ports used by the systems.  Some groups may favor sets of web servers relevant to their 
group roles.  Specific services (reflected by ports visited) may be more necessary to a 
given group. 
 
Of course there is always the null hypothesis, i.e. that people are individuals and behave 
as such within their assigned roles. The J48 decision tree classified the individual systems 
based on the data set fairly well.  This ability to recognize individual systems probably 
enabled it to recognize the randomly generated groups nearly as accurately. In other 
words, individual traits in traffic activities might dominate the group effect, if present. 
This might explain the range overlaps between intra-group and inter-group similarity 
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measures (Figures 2-4). The role group effect was obscured by other, stronger influences 
on network traffic patterns. 
 
One underlying assumption not mentioned to this point is the stability of the distance 
metrics over time. To assess this we performed pairwise similarity computations between 
each of the four work weeks of data for each user, using the Bin Ratio and Kolmogorov-
Smirnov derived methods. In other words, we evaluated how each user’s traffic is self-
similar week to week. Both methods generated consistently high similarity scores, 
appearing to better support the intuition that user feature distributions should persist over 
reasonable time intervals. This was especially true of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov distance 
measure (averaging about 0.9 for most features).  
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VI. VI. CONCLUSIONS  
While a challenging endeavor, being able to compare user behaviors on the network in a 
meaningful way is essential. All too often it is the users on the network that are the 
(insider) threat. Using a set of readily obtained network traffic features, we applied 
known machine learning techniques to look for indications of role based commonalities 
in user network behavior. We also created and tested several approaches to comparing the 
similarities between users and/or groups, to aid in identifying deviations in behavior. In 
doing so, we found several indications that some group based commonalities exist and 
that feature sets can be effectively compared. This work only scratches the surface of 
investigating the impact of roles on computer usage behavior; continued research is 
needed to achieve the end goal of this research: a practical tool that leverages roles and 
other similar information to create more robust envelops of normal traffic flows and uses 
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